

REF ID:A38356

SCAMP 1958

LECTURE VI - 3 July 1958

Section 1 -

~~WV II Systems~~~~126 - Double Playfair~~~~136 - Raster~~~~136 1 - "~~~~136 2 - "~~

Lecture VI - 3 July

238-1	148.1
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254	249
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200.1	
201.1	
202	
202.1	
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199	
199.2	

$\left. \begin{array}{l} 147 \\ 150 \\ 150.1 \end{array} \right\} \text{go in here s}$

We begin now the final session in my series of talks. It will be devoted to ~~four~~ main topics:

- 1) First, what sort of codes + ciphers were we confronted with immediately before and during WWII?
- 2) Second, what were we able to do with them and how did we do it?
- 3) Third, what sort of protective measures were taken to enable our high-level authorities and commanders to use the results of the COMINT efforts + activities?
- 4) Finally, what are the prognostications for the future?

Let's begin with the first of the four topics. What C's + C's, or ~~technically speaking~~ what cryptosystems were we confronted with immediately before and during our participation as a belligerent in WWII?

170.1 - 170.9

~~171 - M-161 - S - Monmouth~~

~~175 - Free data~~

~~176 - help~~

~~61 - 64 174~~

~~177 - CC4~~

~~178 - 1561 - ?? How many to show~~

~~164 - 1461 1461~~

~~261 - A-S~~

230 ~~Small weight~~

129, 130 charging ↓ material

~~Let's begin with the first of the four topics
 What sort of codes and ciphers, or technically speaking
 cryptosystems were we confronted with immediately
 before and during WWII?~~

A. In the European theatre, there was, of course, the
 problem of tackling a multiplicity of pretty high-grade
 1. cryptosystems of the Germans. Take, first, the diplomatic
 ones, of which there were two very high-grade systems
 1) Floradora || 3) Agents (All this + heaven too) &
 2) GEF || Miscellaneous

2. The ~~German~~ cryptosystems of the German Wehrmacht or
 Armed Forces:
 1) Low-level codes (3) Fraker | 4) F a) 3 wheel of Uncle Dick
 b) 4
 2) Double-Playfair | 5) Fish a) Tunny
 b) later fishes || Depth

~~A~~ The Italians ~~would dispose of~~
 But these we were concerned with largely only
 in the Dip area
 By the time our forces were in direct contact with
 Italian military, they were pretty well disorganized &
 what com there were, were in G systems

C In the Pacific Theatre

1 The Dip systems

a Codes, ^{codes} enciphered with transp

b Red

c Purple

~~Green~~

2 Military

a Attaché

b ground forces

c Green

a E machines

3 Naval

JN-25

Naval attaché

[R-systems
 next card]

As long as we are dealing with cryptosystems
 might as well show & tell a bit about R

Difficulty of identifying traffic

M-211

Coleridge

Longfellow

Double tape (Pagoda)

Alb

Scrumb

OTP

65

66

196

1961

LECTURE NOTE

For principal operations of COMINT

Principal operations of COMINT.

1. Intercept (incl. D/F, RFP, TINA)
2. T/A (remarks on validity)
3. Cryptanalysis
4. Translation and emendation
5. Large scale production or exploitation
6. Evaluation of information (military intelligence)
7. Collation with other sources
8. Dissemination

Let's dispose of T/A first.

T/A ~~is~~ is very important for two reasons

- 1) Establishing networks when call signs & frequencies change frequently, as in case of German Armed Forces
- 2) In absence of decrypts - is highly useful & may be the only source of COMINT

Show slides of RFP & Morse Op Ident { 255
256
254

Information from ebb & flow of t/c - 238
Read from "All honorable men" 239

Graph illustrating derivation of important intelligence by traffic analysis in World War II - convoys across the Atlantic from HAMPTON ROADS to ALGIERS.

This chart shows a daily breakdown by security classification of the traffic from Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation to Algiers, North Africa, for the month of April, 1944. Three definite peaks in traffic volume are evident, each of which indicates a convoy movement from Hampton Roads to Algiers.

(over)

238-2

The approximate size of a movement is judged from the totals of messages and groups in the peak period, while the destination and route are given away by addressee call signs in the messages. Close inspection will show the first traffic surge began on 4 April, the second on 13 April, and the last on 22 April. Experience has shown that these traffic peaks appear on the circuit a day or two following the actual convoy sailing date. The convoy movements are therefore "called" on the 2nd, 11th and 20th of April. Furthermore, the traffic study shows definitely the proportions of supplies and

(See 238-3)

troops carried in each convoy. This is due to the fact that all passenger messages are classified SECRET; cargo messages are CONFIDENTIAL. Detailed analysis shows that there were 21,836 CONFIDENTIAL groups, and 3,965 SECRET groups transmitted in connection with the 2 April convoy. The next convoy gave rise to 18,160 CONFIDENTIAL and 4,470 SECRET groups. The third convoy required 19,429 CONFIDENTIAL groups and 594 SECRET groups. It is apparent from these figures that the major function of each of these convoys was to carry equipment and supplies.

RFP

254

255

256

I	II	}	Two different transmitters
I	II		

TINA N Morse Operator Identification

Stop! Don't click - next 2 cards

Cryptanalysis -- most important steps

1. Study external characteristics of messages
2. Study any available collateral including that obtained from previous solution "crypt-continuity"
3. Study beginnings and ends of messages.
4. Search for repetitions between and within messages.
5. Preparation of statistical counts of letters, grps.e
6. Search for indicators.
7. Determine type of cryptosystem used.
8. Separate traffic into groups of messages in same or related keys.
9. Test for probable words, stereotypes, analogies, isologs, homologs
10. Reduce to simplest terms.

LECTURE NOTE

The rest of my talk will be devoted to a brief discussion of modern, practical crypt-analytic operations and gadgetry.

LECTUREFOR SLIDE ~~245~~ ²⁴⁵

Trithemius

~~Collange, Gabriel de~~

(His photo matches the mental picture the average layman has of a cryptanalyst)

The veil of secrecy has produced an air of mystery. Before the World War II, it was possible to do much processing merely with pencil and paper. Now crypt-analytic work is a very big business -- complex, expensive, but pays big dividends.

≡ If time permits - tell Semiramus story

(102)

LECTURE NOTEFOR SLIDE 131

Cryptanalysis of modern systems has been facilitated by the invention, development, and application of special cryptanalytic aids by way of machines. The nature of the problem - not merely the number of permutations and combinations but the type is more important -- question of testing out multiplicity of assumptions and hypotheses, commonly by statistical methods.

High-speed testing is secret

Earliest cryptanalytic devices at Riverbank Laboratories

LECTURE NOTE

134

My memo begging for one set of IBM, dated 30 Oct 1934.

Navy began using IBM - 1932

Combined total ¹⁹³⁴ - 1945
\$ - 750

Now in NSA (1954) - 314

(108)

Extract from 1st Contract with IBM ¹³⁵

Tell how got it put over —

AMG's office had IBM installation
for CCE accounting —

Cancelled when an old-timer can't
see any new-fangled notions

LECTURE NOTE

141

One wing of IBM installation in WW II

(110)

The basic and most important analytic
machines we had were those for German Turing
The Navy Bomber - 90 sets of 4 high sp com with
running at 15000 r p m
The Army Machine X - Electrical relays

Regret I have no slides to show of those
explain why

Gehemnschreiber

147

The Japanese "Purple" - our version

Two slides.

HIGHLIGHTS ON

(119)

To find coincidence count in pair of messages
 200 letters each, ^{at all possible juxtapositions} will require 40,000 comparisons
 By hand 10 hours @ 1/second
 Robin does it at 50,000 per second

To mm Comparator was 1st machine
 Built in late 30's by Bush MIT, put into
 service 1942 85 letters/second

Copperhead - to search for 2 group bits in sweep
 code. Put into use in 1944 - now obsolete with
 701 computer

- 253 - Alcatraz - monographic & digraphic frequency counts
- 145 - Machine decipherment
- 137 - Locating repetitions - 'Route force' machine
- 138 - " " - 'Slide rule'
- 139 - Another machine for decoding & deciphering
- 140 - CAMEL - System
- 145 - " Code indicator locator
- 144 - Assembly of components
- 200.1 - SAS deciphering
- 201.1 - Selective J-square
- 202 } J-square permutation
- 202.1 }
- 142 - Purple dudbuster
- 199 } GEE additive generator (typing)
- 199.2 } over-

- (143.1 - Auto scriber (Roden)
 (198.1 - Geheimschreiber crib tester
 248 - O'Malley - Specialized arith computation - gives
 Accumulations of products of pairs of numbers
 249 - Demon II
 250 } Goldberg - Coincidence machine, general purpose
 251 } large scale. First NSA one
 with magnetic drum for storage
 259 - Atlas

New machines -

- CONNIE I - teletype scrambler - 5000/sec + print
 VIVIAN II - comparator using mercury delay line
 DELLA - 5 million comparisons/sec as against
 Robin's 5000

LECTURE NOTE

137

A "brute force" machine

(114)

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LECTURE NOTE

138

Machine for matching messages

(115)

LECTURE NOTE

143

The "Auto-scriber"

[Rodin - the "Thinker"]

(118)

LECTURE NOTE

145

An analog.

(This was for JAS system (Jap MILAtt))



248

O'Malley

Specialized arithmetic computation Gives summations of products of pairs of numbers having up to four digits

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259 A

ATLAS

STOP! DONT CLICK, See
next card

2 Pacific Theatre

- a Lack of technical know-how
- b Complexities piled on complexities & dependence thereon for security
- c. Errors therefore
- d Methodicalness & stereotypy

3 Billiance of UK-US crypt
 what we owe to UK crypt

4 Money to spend on COMINT activities

Read from Brownell Report

Chart showing ^{processing} steps from
originator to consumer (Army) 234

Chart showing no. of "bullets" 235

~~Slides of State of Alaska~~

Navy C.I. organization
Combined C.I. "

EXTRACTS FROM PART II, BROWNELL COMMITTEE
REPORT
(JUNE 1952)

In World War II COMINT may well have been our best paying investment. Its cost cannot be accurately computed but an informed guess would be perhaps 1/2 billion dollars annually.

General Handy is reported to have said it shortened the war in Europe by at least a year.

In the Pacific, COMINT located the Japanese fleet enroute to the Coral Sea and again enroute

||

(over)

to Midway in 1942, enabling us to mass the carriers for the battles which generally is regarded as the turning point of the war against Japan.

Extract from the report of the Joint Combat Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, on this engagement:

"The factors that vitally affected the Battle of Midway were many and complex, but it is undoubtedly true that without radio intelligence it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of forces and the tactical surprise that made the victory possible."

(See 3)

In 1942 COMINT told of the critical Japanese decision not to join the Axis war on Russia (but U.S. authorities thought the message a "phony" - meant to deceive us!)

In 1944 it helped us to pick the soft spots for our island advance, often showing where the Japanese expected us to attack and where their troops were massed.

The Strategic Bombing Survey mission which checked on shipping losses after the surrender discovered that COMINT's knowledge of the size and location of the Japanese merchant fleet on V-J day had been more exact than the records of the Japanese Ministry of Merchant Marine.

See 4)

Finally, COMINT provided us with our only reliable measure of how fast the Japanese were losing their will to resist. Our leaders had a thorough and immediate record of the peace feelers which the Japanese asked Ambassador Sato in Moscow to send us through the Russians and of the explanations to him of how decisions were being reached and on what points further concessions would be made.

The principal public credit for winning the Battle of Britain has gone to radar and the "so few" to whom so many owed so much. But much credit is also due to another British "few" who rapidly deciphered the high level
(See 5)

combat traffic of the Luft-Waffe, and guided the airborne "few" to the defense of the right place at the right time.

In the war on land COMINT did even better. It read Rommel's intentions in Africa so well that the Desert Fox guessed the truth, he confided his suspicions to Berlin, only to be told by the German High Command that such things were not possible.

Before D-day in France, COMINT furnished several of von Rundstedt's periodic appraisals of the situation for the High Command, showing where he thought the main attack would come, as well as some of Berlin's replies ignoring
(See 6)

Rundstedt's good advice, presumably in favor of Hitler intuition. COMINT also contributed Ambassador Oshima's detailed reports to Tokyo on his pre-invasion tour of the Channel defenses, which led (the Committee has been told), to basic revisions in our landing plans. After the assault was launched, COMINT supplied a large quantity of battle reports and battle orders on every level from the OKW itself down to the various divisions. Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, our estimates of enemy troop strengths, locations and intentions were based more on COMINT than on any other source. COMINT was also the principal source of the information used to select
(See 7)

strategic and tactical bombing targets behind German lines; and it helped us to identify the testing of advanced weapons (such as improved torpedoes and guided missiles) in time to get our scientists started on suitable counter-measures, thus greatly reducing the ultimate tactical effectiveness of the enemy's new developments.

Protection of Comint

As to our successes, have mentioned & read from PH
Report
Now read from Brownell Com Report of June 1952

SECURITY VIOLATIONS

CARD 1

from "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," Vol. II, The MacMillian Company, N. Y., 1948, Chapter 71, "We Talk with Japan," pp. 998.

Actually, we already knew the contents of the message. It contained a statement from Matsuoka to me that the German and Italian leaders were confident of victory, that American participation in the European War would merely prolong it and bring about the destruction of civilization, and that Japan could not injure the position of her allies.

(OVER)

We knew this because of the fact that our Navy and Army cipher experts, with remarkable ingenuity, had broken the Japanese code and were deciphering Government messages from Tokyo to Washington and other capitals, translating them and sending them to the State Department for our information.

These intercepts, bearing our code name "Magic," played little part in our early negotiations, but were of great importance during the final phases. They enabled us to know many of the instructions the Japanese Foreign Minister was sending to Nomura and to other Japanese representatives; they gave us a check on what Nomura was reporting to Tokyo concerning the conversations he was holding with me; and they showed that the Japanese Government was going ahead with its plans even

(CONTINUED ON CARD 2)

SECURITY VIOLATIONS

CARD 2

while talking of peace with us. I looked upon them as I would upon a witness who was testifying against his own side of a case.

I naturally had to be careful never to give Nomura the slightest impression of this special knowledge. I had to take care to keep our conversation limited to the knowledge I might have gained from him or from normal diplomatic sources. So as to safeguard the security of these messages, I named one of my secretaries to handle them, keep track of them, and make sure they were either returned to the Navy or destroyed.

A few words re organization required for effective ⁷ CI operations.

Interception of foreign communications and subsequent processing requires services of large numbers of communications and specially trained personnel. In order that the product may be most useful operationally -- and not merely historically interesting, the intercept traffic must be forwarded most expeditiously to the processing center and after processing, the final results must be transmitted promptly to the evaluators and other intelligence personnel and in some cases directly to field commands by fastest means. This forwarding to a large processing center necessary now because of complexity of modern cryptosystems -- can't be solved in the field -- except low grade and T/A.

Some CI processing can be accomplished in the field as I said before - in order to meet certain immediate needs of field commanders. Each service provides for its own special needs in this category but CI processing is essentially complex activity and much of it can be done well only at major processing plants where the limited number of highly skilled personnel can be concentrated and very specialized analytic machinery can be installed and maintained. -No pool in civil occupations and must train our own very largely in all phases.

How I come to Korea and say
a few words about part played
(122) by AFSS.

Say a few words about very great importance of coordination of COMINT activities with other intelligence operations and with the tactical situation. Although COMINT is the most reliable, the most timely, and the most inexpensive kind of intelligence, it must still be evaluated, collated, correlated, and coordinated with intelligence coming from other sources -- if for only one reason alone -- to provide data for cover and protection of COMINT sources. When a decision has been made to take action based on CI, careful effort must be made to insure that the action cannot be attributed to CI alone. When possible action must always be preceded by suitable reconnaissance and other deceptive measures -- otherwise good guys killed.

Will give three examples of "cover" for COMINT:

1. Tunisia (official report) - 2 German code messages intercepted several hours apart - both solved. 1st stated intent of Germans to attack at particular hour. 2nd postponed attack and gave new time of jump-off. Both solved and sent to Allied tactical command at once. One command after receiving 2nd message made radio broadcast in clear telling story. Germans intercepted broadcast and attack again postponed. Information sent different way. But most important point: they changed all c- and Allied COMINT disappear until new ones were solved.

This second breach committed not by subordinate, inexperienced officer but by high ranker. He got severe reprimand.

--- -- ---

2nd example better and from same report: "On 28 March a new German unit heard for the first time sent two messages. The first at 1335, revealed 2 gun positions. At 1500 a Piper cub was sent over the areas as a decoy for the source of information. At 1600 Allied artillery began to lay down a concentration. The second message from the German unit requested an ambulance. The unit was never heard from again."

3rd example last: From Pacific Theater:

On certain day November 1944, an enciphered code message was sent by a certain Japanese staff section to certain Japanese Air Force units requesting air escort for two convoys carrying troops to reinforce the Philippines. Message gave number of ships, tankers

escort vessels, date of departure and port, route, noon positions for next 7 days; message solved in Washington. Two days after the convoy left one report in message which was also intercepted and solved that it had been sighted by a B-29 with strong indication that other convoy had also been sighted. A few hours later, messages from these convoys reported losses: 6 ships definitely sunk, one disabled, one on fire. Later we learned from another source, in addition, one aircraft carrier was also sunk. Did you notice message about B-29? It didn't "just happen" to be cruising around!

Of course, knowledge and experience point to necessity of exploiting every possible advantage a tactical situation affords and the temptation is of course very great in the heat of battle to use CI whenever and wherever it is available. This may lead to carelessness which quickly jeopardizes CI sources. Of course, full value of CI cannot be realized unless operational use is made of it. However, when action based on it is contemplated, possible compromise of source must always be borne in mind and danger of compromise weighed against military advantages to be gained. Minor military advantage is never alone sufficient grounds for risking loss of source. Also must bear in mind that cryptosystems usually world-wide or area-wide

(OVER)

in usage. Changes made as result of suspicion of compromise may have far-reaching consequences on ability to produce CI elsewhere. A commander seeking a minor advantage by using CI in one locality may deprive another commander of much greater advantages or even deny it to commander of a major operation.

Another aspect of coordination -between operations and CI. COMINT people should be carefully oriented to give optimum coverage for operations in progress. There are just so many facilities and personnel available and only a part of enormous traffic can be obtained and processed. Hence, essential that CI people be constantly informed of current and planned operations so as direct attention where most needed. Also that information is often essential in proper interpretation of certain material and can help in solution.

Advice against knocking out radio stations.

Re current manner of employing COMINT - can be discussed under various headings but neither time nor security rules will permit. However, it is obvious from the Pearl Harbour disclosures alone that the manner of its employment during WW II must have been quite efficacious. I started this talk by reading from TIME and now I'll come back to it to read you some more of the Marshall-Dewey letter because that will give you a pretty good idea of the contribution COMINT made toward our winning WW II. You'll recall that TIME mentioned something about a machine which it called "Magic". Here is a picture of it --last 2 slides! LIGHTS ON.

~~... what everyone of you has had ...~~
 experience more than once in the last few months. It goes like this. You're in bed trying to get to sleep. You've had a bad day at school and things were a bit difficult. To begin with you didn't feel so well when you woke up early from a disturbed and restless sleep - so you were 'dopey' all day and drank coffee or cokes to help you through the day. But now the caffeine is having its effect and you can't seem to fall asleep even as tired as you are. Things begin churning in your mind. What was it that VIP said about our being an easy target for a surprise air attack with A- or with H- bombs?

Who was it that told us our radar fence protection was ridiculous. Our ADC could at best knock down - what was that figure? - at most 10-15% of the bombers carrying the bomb. Yes, and now look at all these columnists' comments on the reports of these special study groups set up to

inst a knock-out, sudden attack ^{Confidential} Let's see: there
 s the Lincoln Summer Study project at MIT It's report
 ared the daylights out of certain of the high brass in
 shington So they appointed another group to evaluate
 e Lincoln report - the Kelly group The Kelly group
 urned in a report that seemed to be so shocking that it
 as practically been suppressed Then the brass appointed
 group to study the Kelly report - the Bull Committee set
 up by the NSC (Read extracts from Alsop) et al

Well, now sleep has left you for good because you feel
 pretty scared - not on account of your own skin - but what
 bout the gal who's asleep beside you and those kids in
 he next room? No wonder you're scared and you're worried
 hat thinking American isn't these days? And we recently
 earned officially they have set off an H bomb What to
 o? Well, cheer up a bit. There's one more possible

answer that the Lincoln, Kelly, Edwards, Bull and Black
Committees didn't get - because they weren't let in on
a certain ^{very secret} secret. It's that ^{very secret} secret I'm going to talk
about this [^]morning. It's name is COMINT.
for the rest of my lecture

Now I don't want you to think that COMINT played no part in the recent Korea Police Action.

I'll come back to that in a moment or two. Before doing so I must say a few words on the subject of the general types of organization for effective COMINT operations.

Extract from: Citation for 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile
for Award of Meritorious Unit Commendation in Department
of Air Force General Order 64 of 11 Oct 1951

"The contributions of the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, in direct support of the UN combat effort in Korea have furnished the UN Forces and the Government of the United States with tactical and strategic intelligence, of incalculable value to the success of the UN mission and to the security of the United States, and have thereby reflected great credit on the unit and the Air Forces of the United States."

With these last remarks I bring to a close the series of talks on history. I've been invited to stay on for a couple of weeks, to participate in SCAMP activities in whatever way I see fit. I plan to sit in on certain presentations by other participants in this symposium; but I shall be available to any of you who may wish to talk with me individually on cryptologic matters
- over -

or on activities of NSA This I will be very glad to do Also, if any one of you wishes to examine and discuss any of the books and exhibits I have with me, I shall be glad to do so.

Thank you very much for your patience in listening to my rather lengthy talks and for your courtesy in paying such careful attention to what I had to say