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2			FILE
			INFORMATION
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4			SEE ME
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REMARKS			
<p>1 Copy to Maj. Sipper on 19 May '54.</p>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE		DATE	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

DD FORM 95  
1 FEB 50Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ  
Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

16-48487-4 GPO

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRIEDMAN

At 1330 on 10 March 1954, a meeting was held in the NSA staff conference room for the purpose of discussing NSA recommendations made on the basis of the "Robertson Report" ("Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning").

The following were present:

Capt. D. M. Agnew	-DCS/P
Col. J. J. Davis	-P/P
Dr. A. Sinkov	-PROD
Dr. S. Kullback	-R/D
Dr. H. Campaigne	-R/D
Lt.Col. J. F. Laudig	-PERS
Mr. O. Kirby	-P/P (arrived at 1410)
Lt. I. T. McDonald	-S/ASST

The meeting was presided over by Capt. Agnew and opened with a general discussion of the points listed under "NSA Study - The Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning."

Dr. Sinkov stated that now there are two aspects to the problem:

(1) There are certain areas covered by the report where action taken within NSA itself can alleviate the situation. This Agency must be certain that all possible internal action is taken to satisfy the recommendations made in the report.

(2) There are certain areas covered by the report that require action outside of NSA. This Agency should make certain that these areas are brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities as soon as possible.

A brief discussion ensued concerning the outcome of the Director's request for 1065 additional people. A/G reported that, although a request for 375 people had been approved, no answer had yet been received on the request for the 1065.

Dr. Sinkov cited Dr. Einstien's personal plea to President Roosevelt as being the initial impetus to the Manhattan District Project of the Atomic Energy Commission. He went on to say that the Director, NSA, has, in the Robertson Report, a reason and a means for doing a similar thing for intelligence and strategic warning, and on the basis of that report he could go directly to the Secretary of Defense and/or the President. In order to take such action NSA must be able to say that we have done all in our power to accomplish our mission and to satisfy the recommendations of the Robertson Report.

Dr. Sinkov continued with the proposal that a brief paper be prepared for the Director stating NSA's position on each point of the Robertson Report on which NSA could act within itself, and NSA's position on each point on which we can do nothing without help.

It was suggested that the Director be verbally briefed on this proposal and that, if the Director approved in spirit, a committee of experts be appointed to prepare the written brief.

Capt. Agnew stressed that NSA should be able to assure the Director that all possible has been done within NSA before external proposals are made.

It was considered that the Robertson Report highlighted three major problems: special intelligence, personnel, and traffic analysis.

It was suggested that a memorandum be prepared for the Director containing: (1) the major recommendations of the Robertson Report with statements on what has been done in regard to each within the capabilities of NSA; (2) a statement of Dr. Sinkov's plan.

It was further suggested that any written paper contain the following ideas:

(1) NSA has carried out the recommendations made to the maximum extent possible.

(2) It is considered that it is within the capability of COMINT to provide a considerable increase in intelligence about Russia and the Satellites than is presently being realized.

(3) This intelligence may well bear on the whole problem of strategic warning as well as being extremely valuable in other areas.

During a general discussion on the proposal, it was recommended that this project be submitted as an entity in itself, completely independent of any previous proposals or requests; and it was decided that the following would be recommended as the basic outline of the proposal:

I. Special legislation for the United States COMINT effort

1. Personnel

a. Increased authorization

b. Relief from restrictive federal service regulations

c. More complete control of the COMINT military career field (including the establishment of COMINT career fields)

d. Control of military personnel rotation.

2. Funding

a. From one to two billion dollars programmed over a five year period (this would be roughly 150-300 million per year compared to NSA's present 60 million per year)

It was decided that Capt. Agnew would present the idea verbally to the Director and then, if the Director was willing, a subsequent meeting would be called for additional discussion.

*J. T. McDonald*

I. T. McDONALD  
LT USAF

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