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TOP SECRET CANCE - SECURITY INFORMATION

FSC53/2/R2 005

9 June 1953

First Progress Report of Sub-Committee 2 (Technical)

- I. The sub-committee finds itself agreed on the following points:1. General
 - a. NATO security is jeopardized by insecure national communications.
 - b. An urgent need exists for speedy positive action to improve national communications security of NATO countries.
 - c. Inasmuch as it appears to be impractical to attempt corrective action by provision of new equipment, action should initially be aimed at the improvement of available systems and practices wherever possible.

	wnerever possible.		
d.	In view of the fact that whatever action is taken to improve communications security will result in the eventual loss of		
	the improvement must be so success-		
/ -	ful as to make it worth paying that price.		
	2. Proposed Action		
a.			
/			

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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applicable to transmission security and that NATO nations
must conform to these standards. It is intended to insert
a strong recommendation to this effect in the conclusions
and recommendations of the final report of the conference.

b. The first step in implementing each action is to bring the
problem into the framework of the Standing Group. This should
be done as soon as the minimum standards for either cryptosecurity or transmission security are agreed by the UK and US.

c. Since

it is impossible
to proceed to improve the communications security of NATO
countries not members of the Standing Group without the full
d.

- e. The preliminary approach should take the form of a diplomatic contact leading to technical discussions.
- f. The manner of the diplomatic contact is a matter for the Foreign Office and the State Department to decide.
- II. The sub-committee has not reached agreement on the following points:
- 1. Whether the approach to non-Standing Group nations should be made to each singly or to all collectively:
- 2. To what extent recessary.

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3. Where, when, and how are preliminary technical	discussions
to be held?	EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
4. Must the preliminary technical discussions	
be completed before the problem is officially referred t	o the Standing
Group?	