

~~REF ID: A58826~~  
~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~

SUBJECT NUMBER

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USCIB: 23/54 Item 3 of the Agenda for the Eighty-fifth Meeting of USCIB, held on 8 May 1953.

~~TENTATIVE~~

Subject: Allied Communications Security.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
EO 3.3(h) (2)

The CHAIRMAN invited comments by Mr. Polyzoides, Chairman of the ad hoc committee which had prepared the report now before the Board.

MR. POLYZOIDES said that he had nothing to add to the report, except to point out two date errors which appeared in Appendix "D", and which he thought all members had been asked to correct. He emphasized the fact that the report was confined to consideration of security violations against NATO classification and communications procedures, and said that he did not consider it sufficiently all-inclusive to serve as a basis for discussions with the British. He informed the members that a further report, dealing with the "leakage" problem as opposed to the question of technical security violations, was now being prepared and would be submitted for possible use by the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming conference.

The CHAIRMAN referred to the recommendations in the report and said that he would like guidance as to how the proper NATO authorities could be made aware of these security violations

MR. POLYZOIDES stated that the "proper NATO authorities" referred to meant the proper U.S.-U.K. NATO authorities, since we have no COMINT agreement with any other powers.

To clarify this point it was agreed to insert "U.S.-U.K." in paragraph 18 of the recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN inquired if "U.S. authorities" was intended to mean the National Security Council.

MR. POLYZOIDES expressed the opinion that the Board might prefer to keep the matter on the COMINT level for the time being, in which case, implementation of paragraph 18 would call for U.S.-U.K. COMINT-level discussions in advance of reference to the NSC.

The CHAIRMAN explained that as a result of the change of administrations in January there were new members on the National Security Council and new heads of other government agencies who probably were not aware of the dilemma [redacted]. He said that he was concerned about this and wondered if it wouldn't be wise to bring them into the picture before the U.S.-U.K. discussions are held.

MR. GODEL asked if it was the Chairman's opinion that the Special Committee of the NSC and the President should be informed.

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The CHAIRMAN replied in the affirmative, adding that it might be unwise to arrive at a position at the COMINT level which was not in line with the thinking of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense.

In the ensuing discussion it was brought out that the Under Secretary of State was familiar with the situation by virtue of his recent chairmanship of USCIB, and that the President, while Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had been aware of the problem; however, it was agreed that the problem would be new to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

MR. GODEL asked if the Chairman had in mind a formal or an informal approach to the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN replied that either would be satisfactory, suggesting that it might be best to discuss the matter informally with the President and the two secretaries after a meeting of the NSC. He said that, if such were done, USCIB's recommendations in the matter would undoubtedly be requested. Accordingly, he suggested that a brief of the problem be prepared for possible use in this regard.

It was suggested that such a paper should be prepared by the Executive Committee.

GENERAL CANINE, commenting upon the problem raised by the Chairman, said that he had somewhat different views. He pointed out that there was no U.S. COMSEC Board in existence and that USCIB had taken certain actions to prevent a vacuum in the COMSEC field - such actions being taken not as an inherent responsibility, but as a responsibility through default. He recalled that an attempt had been made in the past to have the policy question of COMINT versus COMSEC resolved by NSC decision; however, the NSC had expressed its desire to consider each specific case on its merits. He concluded by stating his opinion that USCIB was not the final authority in COMSEC matters.

In reply to the Chairman's inquiry, GENERAL CANINE said that his comments should not be construed as an objection to the suggested procedure. He merely wanted to suggest, he said, that those who were to be briefed be told that the Board was not the final U.S. COMSEC authority, and, consequently, was acting in an ad hoc capacity.

GENERAL CABELL suggested that the membership of a U.S. COMSEC Board should parallel that of USCIB, thus enabling the same members to act with authority in either of the two fields and avoiding the necessity of USCIB acting as a "special pleader" when it presents security problems to the NSC.

ADMIRAL ESPE recalled the tripartite security committee which had been established before the change in administrations, and said that he

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605  
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thought a second security survey had been made by the committee last October to determine what improvements had been made in French general security as a result of the committee's earlier recommendations. He suggested that similar security studies of other countries would be required to insure that information given them (dealing with the inadequacy of their own communications security) would be closely held.

MR. POLYZOIDES stated that the foreign country of primary concern was France, in that the previous BRUSA discussions and the resulting report, which had been approved by NSC, dealt only with the French problem. He also stated that our recent exchange with U.K. authorities was the first indication that the coming conference discussions would extend beyond the French problem to include consideration of the general aspects of approaches to other countries. It was his opinion that the Board would not be in a position to make a presentation to NSC until the [redacted] discussions had been held and certain decisions reached at that level.

Referring to the French problem, the CHAIRMAN again expressed his concern that the present NSC members might not be aware of the action taken by their predecessors. He suggested that the importance of the problem might warrant resubmission to the NSC.

MR. ARMSTRONG reviewed the history of the French problem and indicated that the impending conference, which would consider, inter alia, the timing of an approach to the French, had been proposed by the British on the basis of the second tripartite report, which had revealed certain improvements in general security on the part of the French. He agreed that it might be well to refer the problem to the special committee of the NSC for reaffirmation. He suggested that a brief paper reviewing the problem be prepared by the Executive Committee for Board approval.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR, explaining that the Executive Committee membership had not yet been established, suggested in the interest of obtaining prompt action, that the paper be prepared by Mr. Polyzoides' committee.

MR. POLYZOIDES expressed his willingness to undertake the preparation of such a paper if the Board agreed upon this course of action. He added that the additional reports being prepared by his committee should be available by the end of next week.

The members discussed USCIB consideration of the additional reports in advance of the conference and agreed that a special meeting of the Board for this purpose would be called later in the month. It was agreed that the question of briefing the NSC would be given further consideration after the committee report had been studied.

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The CHAIRMAN asked if security studies of any countries other than France had been made.

MR. KEAY informed the members of his understanding that the matter of such additional studies was being considered.

DECISION: (8 May 1953) USCIB (a) noted the initial report by the ad hoc committee and decided that the committee should continue its study of the additional phases of the problem as outlined by Mr. Polyzoides with a view to submitting a report for the consideration of the Board at a special meeting to be held in advance of the 4 June BRUSA Conference; and (b) agreed to defer consideration of a presentation of this entire problem to NSC until the ad hoc committee report had been reviewed.

This item to be continued on the agenda.

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