REF ID: A71134

DATE: /S Aug

FROM. Executive Director

TO: G-2 Secretariat

SUBJECT:

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	Control O	(15)		-	tective Br	(84)
Asst Chief (Staff)		(20)		Ch, Mar	nt Br	(85)
	Ch, Pers Sec	(21)			Dev Div	(70)
	Ch, Org & Tng Sec	(22)		Tech Sta	aff	(71)
	Ch, Plans & Oper	(23)		Ch, Cipl	a & Ciph Br	(72)
	Ch, Materiel Sec	(24)			Equip Br	(73)
	Ch, Fiscal Sec	(25)		Ch, Elec	& Elec Br	(74)
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().	As Discussed		()	Information	on & File	
()	As Requested		()	Recomme	ndation	
()	Concurrence or Com	ments	()	Signature	if approved	
() Information & Forwarding			()	Your action	on by	
() Information & Return - () Info upon which to b					se reply	
						
you will recall that when he was not						
here Gen. Chamberlain made a rather						
striking statement regarding the						
value of the signist provided him +						
Inly CB + what it meant in						
porrug Casualties & phertening the						
war. I'd like very much to be						
WDGSS FORM NO 96 (Rev 10) 2 APR 46 40374						

aba to granter ham so use it in new set of besties to be prepared for I hat e. war College. Could you ask him please if ore way use it? Would be be underly to put it in writing? 12 dug. We should present to him in writing just what we are going to guste so there will below mistake. Please let me have an extract hom the lecture which I will ask him to ox HST

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF LEMO ROUTING SLIP REMARKS Colonel, GSU A. SOLOWON OFFICE ROOM

25-84008-200M

Those of you who have followed with more than casual interest the sensational disclosures made in the course of long, protracted hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack will recall that time and again "Magic" was mentioned. For example, on page 79 of the Majority Report of that Committee, published on 20 July 1946. you'll find this statement:

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON

THE "MAGIC"

"With the exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness, regarded by the committee as meriting the highest commendation, the War and Navy Departments collaborated in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes. Through the exploitation of intercepted and decoded messages between Japan and her diplomatic establishments, the so-called Magic, a wealth of intelligence concerning the purposes of the Japanese was available in Washington."

and again, on page 232:

"... all witnesses familiar with Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives."

I'd like to recall to you in their own words what some of these witnesses actually said, but there isn't time. However, I'm sure you know that among these witnesses were some of the foremost men of our day—top ranking officers in the Army, Navy, and State Department, and therefore their testimony bears great weight. They all knew the value of this mysterious material, "Magic". What these officers could say in an open hearing was, of course, quite limited, so let me read to you what the Secretary of State said in a memorandum dated 3 January 1944 to the AC of S, G-2, regarding the value of "Magic":

"The Department has found this material valuable at all times, and vital in a number of highly important situations. It would appear that information of this kind, and its analysis, will be even more vital in the future than in the past, both during the period of actual hostilities, and for a considerable period of time (which cannot now be estimated) after the hostilities may be concluded. This material is of great value in determining the facts on which policy must be formulated or action taken."

Coming a bit closer to home authorities, I will quote what Major General Chamberlain, who throughout the war in the Pacific was G-3 on General MacArthur's staff and who is the present Director of Intelligence, recently stated:

"The information G-2 gave G-3 in the Pacific Theater alone saved us no less than half a million casualties and shortened the war by at least two years."

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WASHINGTON 25, D C
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Colonel Hayes Chief, Army Security Agency

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