

~~TOP SECRET~~

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USCIB: 29.17/10

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CON-
TAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL~~


5 November 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Relations with

Reference: (a) CIB #000292 dated 5 November 1954.
(b) USCIB 29.18/16 dated 29 July 1954.

1. The enclosures, LSIB/369/54 and DGC 4952 are circulated for information in connection with the references.
2. It will be noted that LSIB asks USCIB to endorse DGC 4952. If given, such endorsement would include, in effect, a U. S. guarantee to only through UK channels.
3. Accordingly this matter will be included as an additional item of agenda for the 109th Meeting of USCIB scheduled for Friday, 12 November 1954.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures
a/s

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GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS,

OAKLEY, CHELTENHAM, GLOS.

LSIB/369/54.

26th October, 1954.

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Executive Secretary,
United States Communications Intelligence Board.

I attach, for circulation to members of U.S.C.I.B., copies of a paper* summarising the main results of a recent visit to Stockholm by [redacted], of Admiralty. The opportunity was taken, during this visit, to begin the implementation of the arrangements in respect of [redacted] agreed at the L.S.I.B./U.S.C.I.B. Conference on Comint relations with [redacted] held in July 1954.

2. Discussion of urgent action arising from the report has been initiated by Director G.C.H.Q. with Director N.S.A.

3. My Board would be grateful for the endorsement of U.S.C.I.B. to this paper and its agreement to the conditions stipulated by the [redacted] organisation.

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/s/

[redacted]
Secretary,

London Signals Intelligence Board.

*DGC/4952.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.17/10 dtd 5 Nov 1954.

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DGC/4952
18th October, 1954.

SIGINT RELATIONS WITH [REDACTED]
VISIT OF U.K. REPRESENTATIVE TO [REDACTED] SEPTEMBER 1954.

I. INTRODUCTION

After the July 1954 UKUSA Conference on Comint relations with the [REDACTED], it was arranged (with the knowledge of Director N.S.A.) that the action to be taken by the U.K. in respect of [REDACTED] should be initiated when the U.K. officer from Admiralty who conducts liaison with the [REDACTED] visited [REDACTED] in September. This report summarises the results of the negotiations which took place during this visit.

II. [REDACTED] SECURITY

2. One of the tasks of the U.K. representative was to enquire into [REDACTED] security arrangements, to make sure that these satisfied the standards considered to be necessary before the existing U.K. [REDACTED] contacts could be widened.

3. The internal security of the [REDACTED] was found to be of a very high standard. Personnel are accepted for employment only after searching police enquiries, and even then are not permitted to work in any vital part of the organisation unless they are known personally to four senior officers. Documents are maintained which show considerable details about applicants for employment, including blood group and lists of all foreign nationals with whom they are acquainted.

4. The U.K. representative was shown copies of the security regulations of the [REDACTED] organisation, and its "signing on" and "signing off" forms.

5. [REDACTED] control of the security of the recipients of Sigint end-product was found to be less tight than that operated in the U.K. and the U.S. The Director of Intelligence on the [REDACTED] has however agreed to receive a full briefing on this problem when he visits London shortly. The [REDACTED] authorities themselves are confident that after this visit they will be in a position to enforce a degree of security control of recipients adequate to meet the requirements laid down by the U.K.

6. The paper which was presented to show these requirements appeared to impress the [REDACTED], and they are anxious to introduce its principles as soon as possible. As it happens, a re-organisation of both Intelligence and Security is at present taking place in [REDACTED] so that our approach on this subject was very timely.

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.17/10 dtd 5 Nov 1954.

III. [] REACTION TO
PROPOSED U.K./U.S. EXCHANGE

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7. The [] showed considerable reluctance to allow the U.K. to pass material obtained from them to the U.S., but they finally agreed that Elint results could be released forthwith and other material later, subject to:

- (a) satisfactory security assurances (which were given by the U.K. representative);
- (b) a guarantee of U.S. support in the supply to them of modern interception equipment; for both Comint and Elint.
- (c) the supply of such equipment through the existing U.K. channel from [] no other delivery route being acceptable for security reasons;
- (d) complete and immediate cessation of any Sigint (Comint and Elint) approaches to [] by any U.S. authorities.

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3. Because of the inconsistency of the proposed arrangements with the [] policy of neutrality, [] placed particular emphasis on this last point, saying that, if any further approaches were made by U.S. authorities, all the arrangements now being negotiated would have to cease. He added: "I should be hung if these arrangements ever came to light", and said that he would not assist in his own downfall by signing anything. He also stressed the requirement for modern U.S. interception equipment as a quid pro quo for the results which the U.S. would be getting from the new arrangements; money would not be acceptable in its place. (Detailed proposals on the provision of equipment are being taken up with the U.S. Elint authorities).

9. The U.K. representative said he thought it would be possible to satisfy the [] conditions.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS

10. W/T link - The general plan for the setting up of a W/T link between [] and the U.K., for the [], was agreed, and details will be discussed in the course of a proposed [] visit to London in November. It is hoped that the link will be opened in the spring of 1955. The []

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11. D/F tasks

The [redacted] from the U.K. on important targets. Detailed arrangements will be discussed at the November meeting.

12. [redacted]

The [redacted] agreed to increase the number of deliveries of their [redacted] and this has already been effected.

13. Technical feed-back to [redacted]

In view of his findings on [redacted] security outlined in Section II above, the U.K. negotiator decided to release [redacted] [redacted] as agreed, on condition that only the four senior officers known to him personally and the head analyst of the [redacted] organization should see them. This limitation was accepted and the [redacted] showed their satisfaction that the feed-back they had long been pressing for had begun; they said that the [redacted] handed over contained a [redacted] [redacted] not hitherto available to them.