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APPENDED DOCUMENTS CON-TAIN CODEWORD MATERIAL

USCIB: 14/141

11 July 1951

MEIORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence Based on COMINT to Foreign Nationals Serving in NATO or Similar Commands.

1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, is forwarded at the direction of the Coordinator.


2. This subject has been added to the final agenda as an item to be considered at the Sixtysixth Meeting of USCIB, 13 July 1951.

H. (D% JONES J. W. PEARSON Secretariat, USCIB

Inclosure 1 Memo for Chairman, USCIB from Chairman, JIC, dated 9 July 1951.

USCIB: 14/141

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Washington 25, D. C.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

> JIC1-397-51* 9 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence Based on COMINT to Foreign Nationals Serving in NATO or Similar Commands

1. At the request of the Chairman, Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSA-123/wpm, Serial 00089, 18 April 1951), the Joint Intelligence Committee has considered the problem of dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the _______ to foreign nationals serving in the forces of NATO or in the forces of similar organizations in which the United States may participate and has reached the following conclusions:

<u>a</u>. The dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizations in which the United States may participate is essential to the efficient exercise of the command of such forces and to the security of troops of the United States which may be assigned thereto.

	on COMINT produced by the United
States and the	should be disseminated to NATO
commands and staffs by Securi	ty Officers of the United States,
except to	recipients in wholly or
commands. In the la	atter case. the
terminal may be manned by	bersonuer as
appropriate	

 \underline{c}_{\circ} For the purpose of dissemination to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizations, the security of the United States requires that COMINT be divided into the following types:

Type A:	COMINT	which a	may	be	derived	from	the	highe	st
									op
_	her Sat	tellite	80						
							and the second		
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* Implementation of JIC 463/4.

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- Type B: COMINT derived from cryptographic systems of all other powers, from the analysis of Soviet traffic, or from the plain language traffic of the Soviet Union or her Satellites.
- Type C: COMINT called Traffic Intelligence.
- Type D: COMINT defined as Tactical COMINT.

<u>do</u> Dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT produced by the United States and the United Kingdom should be in accordance with the following rules: EO(3.3(h)(2))

Command Element	Peace	War
Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) and Deputy Supreme Allied HQ, C of S ₂ ** G-3 and Deputy, G-2 and Deputy	Type A to SAC and Deputy only Type A disguised*** (at direction of SAC) and Types B _p C and D	All types of COMINT*
Major Force (e.g. Ground Forces Central Europe) CG, Deputy CG, C of S, G-3, G-2	Type A disguised (at direction of SAC) and Types B ₉ C and D	All types of COMINT
Minor Force (e.g. Allied Forces Norway) CG, Deputy CG, C of S, G-3, G-2	Types B, C and D	Type A disguised and Types B_g C and D
Army Group (or equivalent) CG ₂ C of S ₂ G-3, G-2	Types B ₉ C and D	Type A disguised and Types B, C and D
Army (or equivalent) CG, C of S, G-2, G-2	Types B, C and D	Types B_g C and D
Corps, or, where necessary, division	Туре D	Type D

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** Army terms are used throughout this paper in describing echelons of command; Navy or Air Force terminology should be interpolated as appropriate in each case.

*** Disguised as Type B, C, or D, as appropriate.

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<u>Co</u> A combined cipher susceptible to exclusive keying and of adequate security to transmit the highest grade COMINT should be made available to allied commands within NATO and other similar organizations in which the United States may participate.

<u>f</u>. Although the command structure and tactical organization of NATO are not yet clear, the principles set forth herein are considered sufficiently well established and their implementation sufficiently flexible to provide a guide for the dissemination of intelligence based on COMINT to allied commands within NATO and such other international commands in which the United States may participate.

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee considers that USCIB should adopt the above conclusions as the basis for the policy of the United States governing the dissemination of COMINT produced by the United States and the to foreign nationals serving as commanders or on the staffs of the forces of NATO or similar organizetions in which the United States may participate.

Copies furnished: RAdm F.L. Johnson, USN Maj Gen C.P. Cabell, USAF Maj Gen A.R. Bolling, USA Brig Gen V.E. Megee, USMC Director, AFSA FELIX JOHNSON Rear Admiral, USN Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee

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