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USCIB: 9.2/5

14 October 1954

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists.

Reference: USCIB 9.2/4 of 6 October 1954.

1. At a special meeting held Wednesday morning, 13 October 1954, the USCIB Executive Committee considered the problems raised in the reference.

2. The specific questions set forth in the enclosure hereto were presented for consideration by the CIA member.

3. The Executive Committee found itself without sufficient information to define precisely the practical degree of urgency of the solutions desired. In addition, the Executive Committee agreed that a careful study of the problems posed by the questions raised in the enclosure would be required before the merits of the various possible answers could be judged adequately. It was therefore agreed to refer these questions to the Intelligence Committee for further study, a report on the factors involved and recommendations for action in each case except for question K (Is the Intelligence community taking full advantage of non-COMINT sources?) which was agreed to be a matter for the IAC rather than USCIB. In this connection, it was, however, the concensus of the meeting that the early warning information desired might well be found in the COMINT sources sought and somewhat less likely to be found in the other sources known to the members of USCIBEC.



5. USCIBEC agreed that immediate action beyond that listed in paragraph 4 above must necessarily await the above-mentioned report from the INTCOM on the factors involved.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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6. While the INTCOM has been requested to report as many as possible of its findings and recommendations in time for consideration at the October 22 meeting of USCIBEC and in any case not later than the end of October, USCIBEC is doubtful that any action, beyond that listed in paragraph 4 above, which can now be recommended would be likely to bear fruit within one or two months at best.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
a/s

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A.

B. Should we attempt further site surveys of Formosa and Pescadores, recognizing that a site survey has already been undertaken for Formosa? Would it be desirable to undertake a new survey in light of changed conditions?

C. Is there a possibility of establishing intercept facilities on special Navy vessels?

1. Recognize need for special protection of such a vessel or vessels which probably could not make up a part of the fleet. Presumably this would require special protective measures.
2. Has the Navy now got the necessary facilities to undertake such a plan?

D.

E. Should NSA explore the possibility of making an all out "crash" effort on CHICOM traffic with material and personnel now available? Has NSA now got on its staff experts with experience on the Chinese problem, who might be transferred to this problem from other tasks? Would the community suffer from such an effort?


F. Increased pressure for U.S. base on Formosa. We understand that this is to be considered at next USCIBEC meeting.

G. Should we undertake further development of present Okinawa or Philippine bases? It is understood that the site survey in Formosa two years ago indicated that certain promising CHICOM low level material was available in Formosa. Might this also be available from the Philippines or from Okinawa? Has NSA explored possibility of expanding these bases to cover all possible CHICOM low level material which might be available there?

Enclosure with USCIB 9.2/5

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H.



I.



- J. Can NSA give us some estimate of the scale of effort needed to attack the CHICOM low level traffic? Is the scale so large that there is no real likelihood of valuable result from any one or more of the above expedients?
- K. Is the Intelligence community taking full advantage of non-COMINT sources, such as Photographic Recce? Are we relying too much on COMINT?