ID: A53978

TOP SECRET SUBDE -

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

18 March 1952

COPY

TO:

AFSA-02D

FROM:

AFSA-23D3

VIA

AFSA-23D, AFSA-23

SUBJECT: Plain Text Exploitation in the Chinese Military Problem

Since the activation of the Chinese Communist problem at AFSA in mid 1949, a large body of information has been produced on Chinese Communist Military forces. From the standpoint of both quality and amount, virtually all of this information has been derived from an analysis of plain text messages. In the period 15 June 1949 to 5 March 1952, almost 80 per cent of all military identifications were provided by plain text traffic -largely by personal messages on the Commercial Network.

Chinese Communist Military Identifications (15 June 1949 - 5 March 1952)

Source	Number of Identifications	Per cent of Total
Commercial Net Plain Text Traffic	3251	78%
Enciphered Traffic	935	22%
Total	P389	

ORCUMD FORCES:

traffic currently Although provide identification of tactical units in Korea, virtually all identifications of Chinese Communist Ground Force tactical units in China proper (Field Armies, Army Groups, Armies and Divisions) are derived exclusively from plain text: 1,

Echelon	Maximum Number of Units	/ Identi.:	l Percentage fied from	Number and Percentage Identified from Flain Text and Cipher			
Field Armies Army Groups Armies Divisions	70 210 210	4 14 14 15 17	(100%) (64%) (59%) (27%)	14 14 85	(100%) (64%) (65%) (40%)		

Order of Battle - Chinese Communist Ground Forces, 4 December 1951.



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lavel :	ignificantly, the great bulk of COMINT on units above division is available only from plain text traffic. Plain text military fications have provided intelligence of particular interest:
(a) First identifications of the movement of units from South China toward Manchuria, reported in July 1950. 2/
(b) Further indications of movement and identification of units in Manchuria. 3/
	he above reports were issued prior to the Chinese Communist large- intervention in the Korean War.
(c) First indications that elements of the First and Second Field Armies were enroute to Korea, pre-dating front-line identifications by as much as six weeks.
(c	d) Recent disclosure of the shift of the 16th army or its elements to Manchuria from Southwest China. 5/ c) Increase in the level of military unit identifications in South
•	China by solution, through plain text traffic, of military unit cover-designations. 6
vided dispos Proper organi achalo	in brief, identifications of Chinese Communist military units pro- by plain text traffic furnish most of the COMINT information on the sition and movement of the Chinese Communist Ground Forces in China and Manchuria, most of the COMINT information on military district sation in China, the organization of various military headquarters ms, the locations and activities of military schools; and most of MINT information on military supply matters.
AIR	
	The foundation of all U.S. estimates of Air Order of Battle in China unchuriz rests wholly on AFSA plain text reports. Solution of the
2/ Mo	vement of Fourth Field Army Units, 17 July 1950,
≱/ Mo	evement of Fourth Field Army Units, No. 2, 1 September 1950, 5. 15; Movement of 50 Army Troops, 13 November 1950,
No.	venents of First Field Army Elements, 5 February 1951, venent and Current Disposition of Second Field Army Elements, Harch 1951,
2/ [16th Army in Manchuria - Korea Theatre, 14 February 1952,
	ode-Numbering System Used byu8th Army, 25 September 1951,
10	0 October 1951,
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
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system of cover-numbers used by tactical air units made clear the regiment - division relationship and was essential to subsequent interpretation which included enciphered air traffic. 7/

	Regiment, the 3rd, 5th and 18th Air Divisions came from plain text traffic.
	First reference to air training schools appeared in plain text in August, 1950 and formed the basis for solution of the Flight School coverdesignation system and identification of schools. 8/
	With current plain text provides important supplementary information on air units in China and general support to the intelligence effort.
	NAVAL PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
•	Except for limited information evailable from a small amount of Naval traffic passed virtually all COMINT information on the sed derived from plain text messages passed on the Commercial Network. This includes information on command organization.
	INSEPARABILITY OF PLAIN TEXT AND ENCIPHERED TRAFFIC PROCESSING While plain text traffic provides extensive COMINT information on Chinese Communist military units and organisations — in many cases most or all of that information — under no circumstances can the processing and analysis of plain text link activity To do so would damage not only the technical COMINT effort but seriously
	Processing of Far East targets is based on the recognition that crypt- analysis, traffic analysis and linguistic exploitation are mutually depend- ent and that the purpose of each, together, is to provide the maximum con- tribution possible to the reporting or intelligence operation. Information derived from the day-to-day processing of plain text by analysts has enabled those analysts to accomplish and hasten solution of enciphered traffic.

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Milton Zaslow. AFSA-23D3



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