

Note: This is a transcription of the SCAMP (See last page) from the Lectures. Set

Gentlemen, we will begin the final session in my series of talks. It will be devoted to four main topics. First, what sort of codes and ciphers were we confronted with immediately before and during World War II? Second, what were we able to do with them, and how did we do it? Third, what sort of protective measures were taken to enable our high level authorities and commanders to use the results of the COMINT efforts and activities? Finally, what are the prognostications for the future?

Let's begin with the first of these four topics. What codes and ciphers, or more technically speaking, what cryptosystems confronted us immediately before and during our participation as a belligerent in World War II? In the European Theater, there was of course the problem of tackling a multiplicity of pretty high grade cryptosystems of the Germans. Take first the diplomatic ones of which there were two very high grade systems. One of them we called by the code name, which the British used, FLORA DORA. It consisted of an additive system, applied to a basic codebook with numerical code groups. The code group was large to begin with and the additive system, I think you all understand what is meant by that, you add numbers from a book or list to the numerical designations of the code groups and that then becomes the enciphered code text. In the FLORA DORA system the Germans had two separate additive books, each one consisted of 10,000 five-digit groups. You can see that this produces a large number of groups when you can take any one of the 10,000 of one group as a starting point and anyone of the 10,000 groups of the second book as the starting point and these are added together and the sum of

the two additives is then applied to the code group. We were able with the help of the British collaboratively to read most of the messages in that system.

There was another high-grade system used by the Germans which was a one-time system, so called. Everybody thought it was a one-time system. By this I mean a system of the sort which I have just described but using the additive once and only once. Now these messages passed from Berlin to all of the diplomatic posts abroad in quantity by radio and for a couple of years the messages were simply put aside. They were considered hopeless. They gave every evidence of being in a one-time pad system. One day a man travelling as an ordinary traveler, passing through the Panama Canal, was questioned and there was reason to suspect that he might be a German secret agent. Secretly his belongings were searched and sure enough there were discovered among those belongings some one-time pads which he was carrying for some destination.

These were separated from the gentleman in question and were brought to Washington. They were set aside too because they gave every evidence of being the ordinary sort of one-time pad--you use a page, tear it off, and burn it after you have used it. But there happened to be one or two people in Army Security Agency at that time who looked at these pages of pad additive rather intently for some time and they came to the conclusion that those additive groups were not made by some random action, machine of some sort using electronic noise. It was soon apparent that the pages of additive were derived by the action of some sort of machine which gave evidence of

being a generator of one sort or another. To make a long story short we discovered the way in which this machine operated to produce the groups on each page but there remained one difficulty. It seems that the Germans in making up these pads had the machine print these pages in duplicate and these pages, single sheets, were then put on a large table and somebody went around and took a page from one pile and then a page from another pile and just walked at random over and over--what you would call a random-walk in mathematics and in this way the pads were made in duplicate. What was the problem then? We had been able to reconstruct the machine but how to find out which page of a given stream of characters or groups was used for a specific message. We developed a machine for taking a message and passing the code groups of that message against the product of the machine generator at a very high rate of speed and determining in this way the page that was used for the encipherment of the code groups of a specific message. This involved a lot of work but it paid great dividends. We were able to read pretty nearly all of the messages after the elements of the system had been reconstructed.

After the war was over, and we had teams going around following the victorious armies, we captured some records of one of the cryptologic agencies of the German forces and there we found a complete description of this machine. Curiously it had been offered by the manufacturer for sale to the British on the open market sometime in 1935.

We come now to the cryptosystems employed by the Armed Forces of the Germans. There were low-level codes, I think we could start now with the

first slide. That's an example of what was called the ALKA, an Air Force system. I won't go into that. It changed everyday but through careful following the codes were read from day to day.

Next they had a system called the double PLAYFAIR. I won't undertake to go through that--it is a little complicated, fairly secure, but most of the traffic in that was read and they had a thing called RASTER, "Rasterschlüssel." It was a matrix with holes in it, disposed randomly and you had to know where to begin. There was a key, an indicator, and you began a certain place and you wrote the letters of your message in the open spaces and took them out from columns and the roster changed very frequently--I don't remember at the moment if it was daily or not, but it changed very frequently. We didn't have too much luck with it. It was a pretty complicated thing but it was used for the medium level communications.

Then, of course, we had the ENIGMA, used by the Army and the Air Force-- a three wheel machine, I think I showed a picture of that with the plugboard or stecker as they called it. The Navy version of the ENIGMA was a four-wheel machine and toward the end of the war, when the Germans began feeling a little bit uneasy about the ENIGMA, they proposed to make a reversing wheel which would, that is, the 13, the 26 contacts in that reversing wheel could be plugged at random and changed daily or more often. This we called UNCLE DICK and was a very serious threat but the war came to an end before they actually got the thing going.

Now the Germans also had a series of machines which went by the general codename of the fishes. The first such machine was called TUNNEY. It was a

teleprinter ciphering machine and they called it the HANDSCHRIEBER. There were about five different models progressively increasing in complexity. They were solved at the beginning as the result of finding of messages in depth, that is, the setting points, I think this is, oh, that is just a German key list for the ENIGMA--they had many of those captured. This is a HANDSCHRIEBER, a rather complicated looking gadget. I won't undertake to go into it but we read a good deal of traffic in that particular machine and its descendents.

The Italians didn't count for very much. They had codes, codebooks and enciphered codes. By the time our forces were in direct contact with the Italian military forces, they were pretty well disorganized and what there were in the way of secret communications were German--ENIGMA.

In the Pacific Theater the Japanese for their diplomatic systems used simple codes, one for, purely for, economy purposes. Another enciphered code using a basic code which was changed every so often and the code groups of which were then subjected to a transposition and the transposition key changed daily. We were able to keep up with that particular type of system. Just before the war, our participation in it, the Japanese Foreign Office used a machine which we called the RED. It was a cipher machine. Oh, I forgot to tell you about that one. That was the German SG-41, a machine which they proposed to put into use but never actually did. I doubt very much if there was any traffic. They stole Mr. Hagelin's ideas and had a fixed pinwheel and a cage with sliding bars. What they added was a keyboard and the printing mechanism. It was a tremendously heavy thing, very unwieldy and I don't think

think they could have operated it successfully.

This is what we used to read the Japanese diplomatic messages in the RED cipher machine. We never did see a RED machine. It was reconstructed, the system was reconstructed without having knowledge of its actual physical embodiment but we could duplicate what the machine did by <sup>means of</sup> a celluloid disk which was stepped irregularly going to certain keys. I think that this picture represents the Japanese Navy version of the RED cipher machine captured sometime shortly after the war was over.

Then the Japanese had, well that is the Navy's equivalent to solve the RED Japanese ~~REX~~ Naval Attache messages--this was the Navy's version of their analog.

We come now to that famous PURPLE thing used by the Foreign Office for its highest level communications. You all know that the basis for the solution of ciphers is the principle of frequency. Frequency of the use of letters, characters. This means that the distribution of the characters in normal plain text is not homogenous, it is rather ragged, high spots and low spots.

Now, the Japanese who designed their machine figured that since frequencies were the keystone of cryptanalytic solution, they would build a machine which would suppress frequencies in other words, within a certain length of text, it was impossible that any letter could be represented by the same cipher equivalent. This means that in their PURPLE machine which was a 26-character machine, in every line of 26-letters of text, there could be no dual or triple representation of the same plain text letter. This was the fatal flaw. This

is what enabled us to get our first wedge into the system. It was soon after that this phenomena was discovered that we were on the trail and we had some help from cribs that consisted of portions of text that we felt would be found in Japanese diplomatic notes to our Government. The work was slow and painful, very arduous. This was done by the Army crew and there came a day when we had about exhausted our resources. We had recovered some several hundred letters of text and it made sense but at the end of that period there was a series of messages which appeared to me to be the English text of a long note which the Japanese Government had handed to our Government, our Secretary of State, dealing with the announcement of the Economic Treaty that had been in effect for several years. The Japanese were very anxious to have that treaty kept in effect. Well, I worked with my colleagues on the messages and I came to the point where I felt pretty sure that there was a message and it must be in the Department of State's files. Now, at that time, we were under very strict instructions not to go ourselves to seek collateral information but always to work through a designated representative in G-2 and I went to this chap and I asked him to look for a message, such and such a date dealing with the Economic Treaty. He said he would. A couple of weeks passed by, I didn't hear from him. We were struggling with the thing. We would get maybe half a dozen letters out in one day's work. I asked him, well, what about that message? And he said, there is no such message. Well, I felt disheartened and went back to my lair and continued to work, a few more letters, another week, and I became a little bit more sure that there must

be such a message so I went to him again and I said, "Major, will you please check and verify that there is no such message." And he said, "I'll do that."

And a week went by and he didn't come to see me. I went to see him.

"What about it Major" -- "I assure you there is no such message". Well, I was

very much disheartened but I went back, assured my people that we ought to

keep going, it was important. Reluctantly, they continued and we got a few

more letters. By that time, I made up my mind that there must be the message

so in violation of my very clear-cut instructions, I went myself to the Chief

of the Communications and Records Division of the Department of State and it

happened to be a friend and I sat down. "What can I do for you today?" "I

think there is a message here which I would like very much to see in your

files." He said, "Well, if it is here, I will be glad to try to find it.

Give me some data." I gave him the date, subject. He pushes a button and

this girl comes in and within two minutes, that book with the text of that

message was opened before me. And I said, "Dave, I need this." He said,

"You know what my instructions are, you know you can't have it." I said,

"Dave, for goodness sake, don't you have to go out to the can." He said, "Yes,

by the way, I do". I copied the message. That gave us an awfully great

push forward. From then on we were well on the way. We constructed by hand

a very simple device which we could use to duplicate the workings of that

machine, fairly complicated. I have shown you the front of it, back of it

full of wiring. We never did see a Japanese PURPLE machine. They were

destroyed by instructions just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only



thing we ever did see was a very badly beaten up machine burnt and so on in the basement of the Japanese Chancellery in Berlin. Oh, we did have a few pieces. I don't know whether I should ~~xxx~~ tell this or not. After the Army and the Navy got together and played in the cryptologic garden, there came a day when we had reconstructed this PURPLE machine and then I had a telephone call from the Head of the Laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and they had a cipher unit too. He called up and said, "I got something here that might interest you". I said, "Well, I'll come over." So I went over and he told me this story in his office. That on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, a couple of their operatives were watching the Japanese Embassy in Mexico City and a couple of Japanese gentlemen came out carrying two suitcases and they got into a black limousine and they dashed off to the city dump. The operatives followed as closely as they could and watched. The Japanese put something on the city dump and returned to their automobile and after they had left the operatives went to see what there was and they came across a ~~large~~ lot of parts that had been pretty badly beaten up and they assembled them, shipped them in a box and they are in the next room, he said. I put them on the table. Well, I went there and I took one look and I saw that it had the type of stepping relays that were used in this Japanese PURPLE machine, it must have been. We had to duplicate the relays, telephone relays and there I was confronted with a problem. What to say? Well, I stalled, went back and we had a little talk with our friends in the Navy and this is what we decided to do. The FBI was very anxious to reconstruct that machine. We

were very anxious that they not so we sent two men, one from the Army and one from the Navy, our very best technicians, to make sure that they didn't put it together properly.

Question:

Well, they had no functions in the field of diplomatic military communications. Their functions were purely in the area of domestic counter espionage and we thought that they should stick to their knitting. They did, as a matter of fact, after we had an agreement worked out ~~and~~ among us, the three organizations.

Now, so much for the Japanese diplomatic people. When I opened my talks I read you something about the meaning of the solution of that thing. This is our reconstruction after we got underway. This probably doesn't look at all like the Japanese machine did but that's our reconstruction. I think maybe there's another picture--shows some of the wiring in the back--there were three sets of equivalent to commutators.

Now we take up the Japanese military things. The Attaches had an enciphered code, a complicated thing. You remember my telling you about how we were very much discombobulated when the OSS without authority or rather without the knowledge of the military and naval authorities made that raid in Lisbon and put us out of business for a while. The Naval Attaches used a machine. I think that that has something to do with it--well that <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the machine, the set of machines that we used, to read the Japanese military enciphered code systems.

We always tried wherever possible to reduce these hand-operated systems to machine operations so that we could save time and people. The ground forces

had proposed to use a machine that we called the GREEN. It was captured in action and shipped to Washington immediately. It was on field test when it was captured. And we decided that if they were going to use the machine we ought to get ourselves in position to decipher messages in a hurry. There is the keyboard for that thing and so we built machinery to solve GREEN cipher machine messages if they came in. None did. The machine was not successful. It was really a very poor piece of engineering. The Germans furnished the Japanese with some ENIGMA machines and we thought for a while that they were going to go in for ENIGMA and fortunately they didn't. ~~They would~~ It would have made life a good deal more difficult to be confronted with that.

The Japanese Navy used--well, that is a code, a Japanese code which was used by the Ground Forces and they enciphered it by complicated gadgetry, I mean complicated hand-operated things, additives and they disguised the indicators--I used the word additive, I shouldn't have because they didn't actually after a while use the code groups as additive, they used the code groups of the keying table as key groups to encipher them by means of a square of this nature so on.

The Japanese Navy used a system which was an elaboration and quite an elaboration on the strip cipher, called the JN-25 and to the glory of our Navy, they were up on top of it most of the time except when somebody spilt the beans and would publish something like how Midway happened to be won and that sort of thing. I think Marshall Hall could probably tell you a good deal about that and also Dr. Tompkins would have more direct contact to that than I. I mentioned

the Japanese Naval Attache machine which was a good deal like the PURPLE.

AS long as we are talking about machines and enemies, we might as well talk about some of the machines used by the Russians.

In the first place, Russian traffic nowadays is difficult to identify, I mean by that externally very often you can't tell from the message itself whether it is Air Force or Navy or Ground Force or diplomatic. It's all one so you have at the very beginning a problem of isolating the traffic into systems. Now soon after World War I was ended, the Russians built a machine. There I show you the old B-211 of Mr. Hagelin's, the Swedish inventor and this is the inside of that machine which I showed just immediately before. I want you to take note of cave, that is with the sliding bars and here <sup>are</sup> the commutators, these are not actual rotors that were used in the ENIGMA but they are somewhat like rotors. What the Russians did was to build a machine copying that B-211 and modifying it only to the extent of making it a 30-character machine instead of the 25, which the old Swedish machine was and they added a black<sup>box</sup>/to the side so that they could change the connections to those commutators. That machine was in use for about a year or so--we had no difficulty with it. There were other systems that they used which we were fortunate to find answers for--one called COLERIDGE and one called LONGFELLOW, OUR CODE designations. They had one which was of particular interest to me. It was called PAGODA and it was a teleprinter enciphering system which they had copied absolutely, literally from a paper which was published in the Proceedings of the IRE in 1922. It was a double tape system just exactly like

I showed you in one of the slides yesterday where you had two tapes revolving, producing by their inter-action a key which was then applied to the text--the plain text.

Now, the Russians even with that very simple system couldn't work it. In the first place, they gave lots of depths and in the second place, after they found they couldn't work ~~ix~~ two tapes, they worked one tape and they couldn't even work that and they had many, many depths. They gave it up. I imagine that they had some people studying their cryptography ~~intensively~~ intensively because it wasn't very long before we found ourselves up against some very difficult things. They studied hard and they have produced something which thus far is quite baffling. They use one-time pads. At one period of their history, they used these one-time pads twice--this is . What they did was to use say pad 14 between Moscow and Buenos Aires in September to December 1944. Now that same pad would turn up, say three or four years later, 1957 between say Moscow and Ottawa. The trick was to find the double use. Why they used a book, a pad, twice and not three times, I don't know and nobody can give me the answer to that. So far as our investigations have gone, they never used one more than twice and sometime in 1948, 49, I forget now, the double use ceased and we have since then not even been able to prove whether they are using them twice. Dr. Engstrom mentioned the

Of course, if war

should come and it shouldn't be over in ten days or twenty days, the Russians

would not be able to operate their one-time pad systems because we think, we hope, that they would not be able to get new pads distributed. There is a limit to the number of pads that you can store and therefore they would have to use something else. At the moment the Russians have not any one of their two important cipher machines anyplace outside their own territory with the exception, you can call East Germany their territory I suppose. There is something in Berlin but that is all. They don't use their machines for communications abroad. This does not necessarily mean that they don't have them. They might have them in readiness but nobody can tell.

Now, I'm going to--I think that's the end of that series, let's see--well that's the inner workings of that M-211, as we called it, the Russian machine, I think that's the last of the series.

I'm going to talk <sup>briefly</sup> ~~generally~~ about some general principles and then we will have a break and then we'll resume. Now some of this will be "old hat" to some of you but for the newcomers, perhaps it's wise to mention the principal operations upon which communication intelligence activities are based. First,

of course, there comes the intercept--you've got to have the <sup>traffic and getting it</sup> ~~material~~ <sup>systems used by all large governments</sup> ~~material~~ is no small trick. ~~The~~ modern electrical high-speed communications require

high-speed intercept operations, and together with the intercept, there must

be direction finding, when you are working on the <sup>mobile</sup> ~~communications~~ <sup>army or foreign</sup> ~~of armed~~ forces, ~~of a government~~.

The Russians, for example, have <sup>complex</sup> ~~complicated~~ call sign

systems, <sup>by</sup> complicated shifting of frequencies, so that it is important to be

able to identify transmissions either by direction finding or by one of two

other types of operations. One is called radio fingerprinting, which <sup>takes advantage</sup> simply

<sup>of the fact</sup> means that every transmitter emits electro-magnetic radiations which have characteristics <sup>of that transmitter and</sup> that are analogous to the characteristics of a fingerprint and

it is possible therefore to identify a transmitter by studying the characteristics <sup>when the headquarters served by this transmitter and the transmitting station move, the</sup> of its emanations. It is also possible to identify <sup>hand-operated</sup> Morse

telegraph communications. That is, every operator has characteristics of his <sup>operator of</sup> own hands and wrists and you can identify them by studying <sup>their</sup> the transmissions of Morse

operators, identify them, <sup>whenever or whenever they move.</sup> This is very useful. Much work remains to be done

in direction finding, in radio fingerprinting and in Morse operator identification. ~~I think that that slide I cut off is an RFP test shot showing a~~

<sup>and</sup> ~~recorded transmitter and one that you have in the record and compare it to a~~  
~~new transmission to see if the shape of the waves is very very similar. There~~

~~is another one. here is Morse Operator identification~~ dots,

~~the length of dots, the difference between dots and dashes and lengths of~~  
~~dashes, the characteristics of each operator. (Now cut the lantern off, I~~  
~~think we will go on for a moment.)~~

*Begin again later*

The next step after interception is traffic analysis, that is, the reconstruction of the radio nets of the enemy and the location of their transmitter stations. This gives very important information on two counts. First of all, establishing or reconstructing the nets gives you order of battle which is very important. The reconstruction of the networks is not an easy thing for when the call signs and frequencies are changed rapidly. It is a curious thing that the Germans seemed to be able to change their call signs

and frequencies without too much trouble--it gave us and the British a good deal of trouble, <sup>and</sup> ~~to begin with~~ <sup>a good many</sup> We had to keep people working at it all the

time, but I contrast that with the situation in our own Armed Forces, our ground forces at least. It has not been possible to get our Army to adopt a sensible system of callsign changing. They say, you will either have communications or you will have callsign changing, you can't have both. When it is pointed out to them that other armies do it and have done it, they have apparently no answer. The Navy changes its callsigns and changes its frequencies--maybe their problems are a little bit less difficult/

~~the~~ the second good reason for engaging in traffic analysis is that

every once in a while your cryptanalysis meets a roadblock and you don't have

COMINT, in which case

any ~~you don't have any COMINT from decrypts~~ so the only thing you have to

non-COMINT

fall back upon are ~~these other~~ sources of information, aerial observation, <sup>for example,</sup>

~~pictures and that sort of thing~~ but <sup>you still can get good information from</sup> traffic analysis from simply watching the

ebb and flow of traffic, <sup>changes in routings, etc., from which</sup> and the direction you can make inferences of what is

happening or

going to happen. Now these, mind you, are inferences -- they are not right

out of the horses mouth as decrypts are.

to which I'll return in a few moments, after I've

The next step, of course, is cryptanalysis, <sup>solution of the messages</sup>

<sup>outlined briefly the succeeding steps in COMINT production. It is obvious that</sup> ~~the decrypts,~~ <sup>have to be translated into good English</sup> if they are in foreign language, ~~the translation and with the translation~~

<sup>amendation, because of</sup> there is always a certain amount of ~~inaccuracy~~ <sup>you've got to make corrections.</sup>

Errors in transmission, <sup>or</sup> excess in reception, <sup>and</sup> errors on the part of the <sup>by</sup> cipher

clerk, and so on. Then the next thing is large scale production or exploitation.

You are not dealing with single <sup>or just a few</sup> individual messages a day--there are



thousands of them. I'll show you a graph later on--what this means.

The next step is the evaluation of the information and mind you, I've

been talking about the COMINT product as information. This is something which

the intelligence people are most insistent about, ~~The COMINT people don't~~

~~produce intelligence they say, they call it information, communication~~

~~intelligence information, if there is such a~~ ~~expression.~~ It's

*saying that it's* ~~the COMINT~~ *and check*  
 their job to evaluate ~~it~~ and to collate ~~it~~ with information from other sources.

~~to check it and that sort of thing.~~ And I suppose that this is a very

necessary thing. It is conceivable that an ~~enemy~~ astute enemy, might

actually mislead you by sending out a phoney or two in which case the intelli-

gence people should be able to detect <sup>*the spurious message*</sup> this character by collating what it

<sup>*there is*</sup> says with what it ~~has~~ from other sources.

And then there comes finally the dissemination of the product and this <sup>COMINT</sup>  
 has to be very, very carefully controlled. *end*

Now, I think we have reached a good stopping place and we will have a  
 break of about five minutes, no more, as we have a good deal of territory to  
 cover and we want to finish here by 4:00 o'clock at the latest, I'd like to  
 make it 5 minutes to 4:00 so that those of you who want to attend the other  
 talk will have time to walk over to the building.

*For this purpose there were special cryptosystems and  
 special security officers, and the decrypts were  
 kept out of the normal communication or message  
 centers, so as to keep the number of persons seeing  
 them to an absolute minimum. All of them have  
 to have a special clearance; they take special  
 oaths on signing on and off.*