

## MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,  
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
		INFORMATION
3		NECESSARY ACTION
		NOTE AND RETURN
4		SEE ME
		SIGNATURE

## REMARKS

Capt M -  
I think we should follow through on this.  
Please prepare a memo for my sig to C/S through C/SEC at PKOD, using much of the material you have here in your memo to me. Include in it the things suggested in your memo of 19 June.

FROM NAME OR TITLE

DATE

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

TELEPHONE

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-16-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

DD FORM 95  
1 FEB 50

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

16-48487-4 GPO

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Friedman  
FROM : Captain McDonald  
SUBJECT: C/SEC Violations

DATE: 19 June 1954

1. Possible actions and/or recommendations whereby NSA might be able to reduce the number of C/SEC violations:

a. Encourage the cryptologic agencies, and the Services as a whole, to make cryptosecurity the primary duty of the responsible officer rather than an additional duty as is too often the case.

b. Assignment of a well-qualified NSA C/SEC man to NSAEUR, NSAFE, etc. to advise and instruct the responsible crypto officers on the specific nature and causes of violations and the many tools and publications available to help prevent breaks if utilized properly. This NSA man could run a quarterly critique, based on the violations listed in these reports, and easily trace each break to the operator and machine concerned and give on-the-spot instruction on the proper use of the available tools to avoid the possibility of such breaks in the future. / 13

c. Encourage a vigorous and continual on-the-job education of the operators and the responsible officers in the existence, availability, and use of the AFSAGS, JANAPS, OI's, etc., and the machines themselves.

2. This is one area where the lack of sufficiently well-qualified personnel can be partly overcome simply by continually reminding those available of the proper use of the tools and detailed instructions available to them. However, human nature being what it is, a vigorous, continual program should be followed. In view of NSC 168, it is entirely within the scope of NSA's authority to execute such a program.

3. Some of the actions mentioned above are undoubtedly being carried out in some degree in one place or another. However, I do not believe that there is a deliberate, well conceived, over-all effort with a singleness of purpose designed specifically to promote a vigorous and continual on-the-job educational program to reduce the number of C/SEC violations.

4. Such a program could be undertaken with very little cost by:

a. Sending appropriate letters to the Services and the cryptologic agencies.

b. Deliberately assigning a C/SEC expert to each NSA overseas headquarters and charging him with the appropriate responsibilities.

*I. T. McDonald*  
I. T. McDONALD  
Captain USAF

*Incl 2*

Col. Davis 19-331A

Col. Davis (C/SEC) talked with Mr. Austin in reference to this situation and my recommendations. According to Col. Davis, Austin feels that for NSA to initiate such a program as this would be superfluous. ("The Services themselves are taking care of it.") The Navy's C/SEC is bitter than Army's or Air Force's because the crypto (enciphering and deciphering) is done by an officer.

DM