DUTING AND WORK SEET

(PAR. 40.62 O.R.)

By Authority of the Chief Signal Officer Initials Date

SUBJECT Comments on "Security of U.S. Military Communications"

(Memo dated 1 September 1943)

Number each action	То—	Memorandum	Name, Division or Branch, and Date
1	Col.Corderma	n 1. During my visit to England	
		I had two sessions with Paymaster	
	,	Commander Dudley-Smith who coordinates	
•		information relating to the German	
		Army Y Service successes with British	
		and Allied cryptographic taffic. In	
		regard to compromises in North Africa	
		he indicated that their information	
		showed some scanty evidence of the	
		Germans reading certain low-grade ciphe	
		but he stated that probably most of the)
		data obtained were from their inter-	
		ception of radiophone conversations	
		in plain language. There was no evidence whatsoever of the Germans	
		being able to read high-grade or even	
		medium-grade cryptographic traffic of	• •
	.i.	either the British or Americans. In	
		one or two cases where a code or cipher	 A set of the set of
		was obtained by capture, there was a	
		temporary reading of a few messages.	
		For example, from 18th to 28th of	
		February, the German Army Y Service	
		in Tunisia communicated back to higher	
		headquarters a considerable number of	-
		"decoded and partly decoded" American	
		Army messages. The time lag between	
		interception and the dissemination of	
		the alleged decode varied from 6 hours	
		to 5 days. GC & CS initiated an inves-	
		tigation but no definite results had	
		been produced, although later information	
		indicated the possibility of another	
		compromise by capture. There was no evidence at all of the Germans being	
		able to read our M-209 traffic at that	
	•	time.	
		CTING.	
		2. Elsewhere, I have encountered	
		references to the fact that many of the	1
		communications from American Air Liais	
		Officers are in plain language and that	
		their communications are not so secure	
		as they might be boom of	
		approved for release by NSA on 11-12-2014 pursuant	

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DUTING AND WORK SEET

(PAR. 40.62 O.R.)

SUBJECT Comments on "Security of U.S. Military Communications"

(Memo dated 1 September 1943)

Number each action	То—	Memorandum	Name, Division or Branch, and Date
		this is found in the fifth example on the attached memo.	
		3. However, the nature of the majority of the translations in the accompanying memo do not appear to me such as might have been intercepted in plain language and I think an in- vestigation would be well worthwhile. In view of the fact that this informatic comes from the highest grade sources, care will have to be exercised in making	ng
		the investigation so as not to disclose the source. For this reason it is recommended that a letter be sent by airmail to Colonel Hayes forwarding the information contained in the attached memo, and asking that he make a very quiet and discreet investigation	
	•	to ascertain, if possible, the nature of the transmissions and the codes or ciphers that were employed or any other circumstances which might shed light on the situation.	
	·	4. It is possible that the Britis themselves have already initiated such an investigation and we should therefor check with them before taking any steps ourselves.	re
	• .		W.F. Friedman Dir. Com. Res. SPSIS-3 3 September 19

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