US/UK Sec. Conf. file



#### EIGHTY-SIXTH (SPECIAL) MEETING

FINAL

20

25/5

#### OF THE

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman

PRESENT:

DEFENSE: Mr. Charles P. Noyes

STATE: Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

FBI: Mr. V. P. Keay

(for Mr. D. M. Ladd)

NSA: Lt. General R. J. Canine, USA

ARMY: Major General R. C. Partridge

NAVY Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe

AIR FORCE: Colonel C. M. Townsend

(for Brig. General J. B. Ackerman)

CIA: Mr. H. D. Sheldon

SECRETARIAT: Captain R. L. Taylor

LCDR P. J. Karl, USN Mrs. D. O. Tucker

Removed and filed
ALSO PRESENT: USCIB: 23/64

DEFENSE: Mr. Wm. H. Godel

STATE: Mr. T. A. Polyzoides

Mr. R. F. Packard

FBI: Mr. S. D. Ellis

NSA: Colonel J. O. Gregory, USAF

Captain D. M. Agnew, USN

Mr. W. F. Friedman Dr. L. W. Tordella Dr. L. E. Shinn

ARMY: Major General H. Reichelderfer

Lt. Colonel Glen C. Long

Mr. Grady Frank
Mr. A. Small

TOP SECRET CANOE

NAVY:

Captain B. F. Roeder

Captain W. M. McCormick

Captain G. Grange

AIR FORCE:

Major H. J. Thompson

CIA:

Lt. General C. P. Cabell, USAF

Mr. F. B. Rowlett

The Eighty-sixth (Special) Meeting of the United States Communications Intelligence Board was held in the Projection Room, Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency, at 1430, on Thursday, 28 May 1953.



## EIGHTY-SIXTH (SPECIAL) MEETING

## OF THE

## UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD

#### CORRECTION SHEET

Page, Paragraph of Final Copy		TEXT (Tentative and Final)
Page 4, Para 4 (5th line)	Tentative:	" that the JCS had assured themselves that"
	Final:	" that the JCS had decided to assure themselves that"
Page 4, Para 5	Tentative:	" will cover all COSMIC or only COSMIC that is originated by the military."
	Final:	" will cover all of the military com- munications of NATO countries or only the NATO communications originated by the military."
Page 5, Para 8	Tentative:	" no real analysis had been made of the military traffic problem and wondered"
	Final:	" no real analysis (from a COMINT point of view) had been made of the military traffic, and wondered"
Page 5, Para 8	Tentative:	" Such an assumption would permit us to go along with the British view."
`.	Final:	" In view of the JCS decision to improve the security of NATO military communications, such an assumption would permit us to go along with the British view."
Fage 5, Para 9	Tentative:	" there was not enough traffic available to draw any valid conclusions."
	Final:	" there was not enough military traffic available to draw any valid conclusions (from a COMINT point of view)."

# TOP SECRET CANOE



Pag	gе,	Par	ragraph
of	Fir	al	Сору

#### TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 5, Para 10 (Last para)

Tentative:

MR. SHELDON said that would fall along the

lines of the JCS decision and he couldn't go

along with that language."

Final:

"MR. SHELDON said therefore we would be following along the lines of the JCS decision

and that he could go along on that line."

Page 6, Para 1

Tentative:

"... his security hat on and it was his assumption that we had to get these machines

out in order to improve our security."

Final:

"... his security hat on. It was therefore his assumption, he said, that we had to get out the machines decided upon by the JCS, in order to improve our security in NATO."

Page 6, Para 2

Tentative:

"MR SHELDON stated that the report said that no investigation had been made in that field, but that CIA did feel one was necessary."

Final:

"MR. SHEIDON repeated that the report said that no investigation had been made in that field, but said that CIA did not feel that

one was necessary."

Page 6, Para 5

Tentative:

"... wished to point out that such an

appraisal did not exist."

Final:

"... wished to point out that the basis for

such an appraisal did not exist."

Page 7, Para 3

Tentative:

"... have concluded that cryptographic

systems are not sufficiently ..."

Final:

"... have concluded that the cryptographic

systems now in use are not sufficiently ..."

Page 8, Para 5

Tentative:

"... difficult to say because there is no cooperation between cryptographic security in foreign nations and the cryptanalysis

people. ... \*\*

Final:

"... difficult to say because it appears: there is little cooperation between the communications security and the communications intelligence personel of the NATO nations."



•	——————————————————————————————————————	ECURITY INFORMATION—
Page, Paragraph of Final Copy		TEXT (Tentative and Final)
Page 8, Para 7	Tentative:	" that NATO communications and military communications of these countries"
	Final:	" that NATO communications and national military communications of these countries"
Page 8, Para 7	Tentative:	" He said that the military communications are"
	Final:	" He said that the national military communications are"
Page 8, Para 7	Tentative:	" that NATO COSMIC be transmitted in only one system."
	Final:	" that NATO COSMIC not be transmitted in a national system."
Page 8, Para 10 (Last para)	Tentative:	" almost in complete agreement as to the analysis of the 'busts' communications-wise."
	Final:	" almost complete agreement on this point."
Page 9, Para 5	Tentative:	
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 EO 3.3(h)(2)		
	Final:	



#### Page, Paragraph of Final Copy

### TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 9, Para 7	<u>Tentative</u> :	"MR. POLYZOIDES stated that the violations had been considered in the strictest sense of the word as part of NATO. He added that the violations covered in the first part of Tab A are leakages that do not constitute"
	Final:	"MR. POLYZOIDES stated that the Ad Hoc Committee had considered 'violations' in the strictest sense, i.e. as being those instances wherein communications containing COSMIC or NATO information had been enciphered or transmitted in violation of NATO COSMIC regulations. These were dealt with in TAB A of the Report. TAB B of the Report dealt with leakages that did not constitute"
Page 9, Para 9	Final:	Delete this paragraph.
Page 10, Para 1	<u>Tentative</u> :	" necessary to tell them that they carried on demonstrations for these five countries."
	Final:	" necessary to tell them that such demon- strations were being made especially for these five countries."
Page 10, Para 3	<u>Tentative:</u>	" intelligence value made on the basis that it was a message damaging to U.S. interests."
	Final:	" intelligence value made only on the basis of messages damaging to U.S. interests."

Page 11, Para 12

Tentative:

"... that if we buy para. 3 as now written,

there is no charter and no point of meeting with

the British."

Final:

"... that if we buy para. E3 as now written,

there may be no point in meeting with the British."

Page 13, Para 11

Tentative:

"At this time GENERAL CANINE asked Mr. Friedman,

Head of the U.S. delegation to read his recom-

mendations."

Final:

"At this time MR. KEAY asked the Chairman if he

would have Mr. Friedman, Head of the U.S. delegation, read his recommendations.