

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

19273

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

31 December 1953

G2-PC

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

SUBJECT: Report of the Study Group, NSA Scientific Advisory Board
(NSA Serial 000565-S)

1. I have reviewed the subject report and have the following comments thereon.
2. I do not consider that it is realistic to conclude, as the Study Group does, that COMINT or any other source of intelligence can guarantee four to twelve weeks' warning of a Soviet intention to mount an attack against the U.S. In the COMINT field I do consider, however, that the most likely source of obtaining such warning is the solution and timely exploitation of Soviet high-level cryptographic systems. I concur, therefore, with the recommendation of the Study Group that "top priority should be accorded to the solution of high-level Soviet Cryptographic Sources and their exploitation on a timely basis" in order to maximize the potential of COMINT for giving strategic warning of hostile attack against the U.S.
3. I am also of the opinion that the traffic analysis effort against Russian traffic should be expanded, particularly those phases of the traffic analytic effort essential for the support of the cryptanalytic attack against high-level Soviet systems. I am not, however, in full agreement with the Study Group in its conclusion that traffic analysis fusion of Russian communications is necessarily our next best source of strategic warning of attack against the U.S. I consider that the solution of high-level Soviet Orbit communications, particularly Chinese, is as likely to provide the U.S. is still faced with the requirement for early warning of the outbreak or resumption of localized hostilities against U.S. forces or those of its Allies. I consider that solution of high-level Soviet Orbit traffic, particularly Chinese, is potentially our best source of such warning. Further, in the event hostilities are resumed in Korea, solution of high-level Chinese and North Korean traffic will be imperative.
4. I consider, therefore, that every effort should be made to augment NSA effort on Soviet and Soviet Orbit high-level cryptographic systems and have instructed my representative on the NSA Priorities Committee to work towards that end.

Copy 1 of 4 copies

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

COPY

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~

31 December 1953

G2-PC

Memo for DIRNSA, "Report of the Study Group, NSA Scientific Advisory Board (NSA Serial 000565-S)"

5. The report of the Study Group concludes that "personnel policies should be revised to improve the selection, training and retention of personnel, both civilian and military, for COMINT activities. Strong recommendations should be made to the Services and the Civil Service Commission to effect these changes." The procedures for the selection of personnel for Army COMINT activities are under continual review and analysis to insure that the best qualified Army personnel are made available to the Army Security Agency. In conjunction with NSA, every effort is being made by the Department of the Army to improve the training of Army Security Agency personnel and an intensive program is underway to re-enlist trained Army Security Agency enlisted personnel at the end of their term of service.

/s/

MARK McCLURE
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy A.C. of S., G-2

~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~