

~~TOP SECRET CANOE~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

USCIB: 29.1/1

20

21 September 1953

~~TOP SECRET CANOE - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. EYES ONLY~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO Countries.

References: (a) USCIB 23/70 dated 10 July 1953.
(b) USCIB 14/313 dated 18 August 1953.

1. In response to the decision of USCIB at the 88th Meeting, 10 July 1952, the Department of State Member, as cognizant U.S. Authority with respect to certain preliminary steps contained in the report of the recent US-UK Conference on the above subject, prepared recommendations concerning (a) the terms of reference and composition of the Combined (US-UK) Working Group to be set up in Washington to facilitate coordination of the program to improve the communications security of NATO Countries and (b) the nature of the initial approach to the French Government (Reference a.).

2. On 20 August 1953, USCIBEC considered the recommendations of the State Member, (Reference b.) and agreed as follows:

a. To appoint an ad hoc committee consisting of members from the Department of State (Mr. T.A. Polyzoides), NSA (Mr. W.F. Friedman, and possibly Mr. F.C. Austin), and FBI (Mr. V.P. Keay) to take cognizance of Allied (NATO) Communications Security Problems on behalf of USCIB.

b. That the Department of State member would revise reference (b) in accordance with views expressed in the meeting, and, upon the concurrence of the members of the aforementioned ad hoc committee, would forward the revision to the Executive Secretary for forwarding to USCIB as an agreed USCIBEC paper.

3. Accordingly, the following recommendations, which have the approval of USCIBEC, are forwarded in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive No. 1. Absence of objection on the part of any member prior to 1700, Friday, 2 October 1953, will be considered to constitute USCIB approval of the recommendations set forth in the following paragraphs and such actions as USCIBEC has to date taken with respect thereto.

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Appendix A

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4. The Combined (US-UK) Working Group. To assure that the COMINT aspects and limitations of this program are properly coordinated, the Combined Working Group should be under the direction of USCIB and LSIB. It should serve to:

a. Coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach to the French, subsequent technical discussions, preparation of a memorandum to be issued by the NATO Standing Group and formulation of minimum security standards;

b. Coordinate, between the US and UK, conclusions as to the status of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this program develops; and

c. Coordinate US and UK recommendations for further steps, as envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, should this program not accomplish the desired response from NATO countries or improvement in their COMSEC.

The US element of this Group should also serve as an ad hoc subcommittee of USCIB to keep this entire program under continuous review for the Board. To this end, the US element of this Group should include representatives of the Department of State, FBI and NSA supported by the advice and assistance of representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and CIA as needed. The overriding political character of the initial phases of this program indicates that the US element of this Group should be headed by its Department of State member.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

✓ 5. Considerations affecting the initial approach to the French.



improvement by the French will have to be achieved indirectly, i.e. by inducing them to agree first to a program for the improvement of the COMSEC of NATO countries through the existing COMSEC mechanism of the NATO Standing Group and then to agree to preliminary US-UK-French technical discussions to assure adequate COMSEC practices within the three governments.

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c. It will be imperative that all contacts made within the French Government are secure and are given adequate authority.

d. The Tripartite Security Working Group (US-UK-French), which has been in existence since 1950, would appear to offer the best means of achieving an orderly and secure arrangement for direct discussion between the proper COMSEC authorities of the three governments. Although the work of this Group has not heretofore included COMSEC matters, the Group has developed cooperative and secure contacts among responsible French authorities in general security matters.

✓ 6. The initial approach to the French. To assure wholehearted cooperation by the French in sponsoring jointly with the US and UK the overall program for other NATO countries and in making effective improvements in French COMSEC, the French Government should be approached first at the cabinet level. The project should then be assigned to the Tripartite Security Working Group to establish proper contact between COMSEC authorities of the three governments. As a practical matter, and as a means of achieving the greatest possible compulsion, this approach should be undertaken jointly by US and UK representatives.

a. Phase 1. At the cabinet level the French Government should be requested by the US and UK ambassadors to agree in principle that the overall security of NATO requires that a broad program be undertaken to improve the security of the national communications of NATO countries, and that this program should be initiated through the Standing Group as a logical extension of the existing COMSEC program of the NATO organization itself. The French Government should be requested to agree further that such a program should be preceded by US-UK-French discussions to assure adequate COMSEC practices within the three Standing Group countries, and that, to this end, the terms of reference of the Tripartite Security Working Group should be extended to include the establishment of arrangements for technical discussions and the selection of competent and proper COMSEC authorities to undertake these technical discussions and implement their results within the three governments. This phase should be handled by the Department of State and the Foreign Office.

b. Phase 2. The Tripartite Security Working Group should then select the COMSEC authorities who will represent their Governments and make suitable arrangements for their technical discussions. This phase should be handled by selected members of the US and UK Tripartite Security Teams as agreed between the participating agencies.

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
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c. Phase 3. The COMSEC authorities should then proceed to the discussion and implementation of adequate COMSEC practices within the three Governments. US participation in this phase should be handled by the National Security Agency (NSA).


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
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Executive Secretary, USCIB

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